The Outsider. The Misfit. The Outcast. He (and it most typically is a he) has become an archetypal figure in literature, one who disgusts and delights readers in equal measure. The Outsider conjures within our minds an image of a gaunt, bookish, prematurely world-weary man who idles away his time contemplating the nature of his outsider-ness. He recognises, though may not always fully understand, his fish-out-of-water status, and feels a certain amount of contempt towards the rest of society for being blind to the truths that he somehow sees. It is not so much that the Outsider does not want to fit in with society, rather that he can’t help but not fit in. The Outsider is Hamlet, Gulliver and Stephen Dedalus. The Outsider is practically every protagonist that features in the work of Kafka as well as the alienated youth Holden Caulfield in J. D. Salinger’s beloved The Catcher in the Rye. The Outsider certainly seems to feature in many examples of what is generally considered to be “great literature” and yet he hardly tempts imitation.
Everything the Outsider does seems to vehemently discourage the reader from emulating him. The Outsider is not heroic, altruistic or valiant. He mopes around, moans and complains about the rest of society, seemingly “content” to wallow in his own misery. Because of his despairing existentialist angst there is definitely ‘something nauseating, anti-life’ about ‘these men without motive who stay in their rooms because there seems to be no reason for doing anything else.’ However despite their apparent toxicity, the Outsider indubitably remains a perversely fascinating creature. Through his deliberate detachment from society he acts as critic and commentator of values and norms that are taken for granted. By standing apart and operating on the peripheries of society, the Outsider grasps at the problems that seem to be the root of our collective contemporary anxiety in the contemporary world. He forces us to look at the world we live in differently, unfamiliarly, objectively. As such the reader becomes the Outsider vicariously through the fictional figure, and by stepping outside of society, the reader experiences a wayward thrill in breaking away from the societal structure that is meant to keep us in our place. Are these fictional figures meant to inspire lasting changes within the individual and society or temporary relief?
By analysing aspects of two of the most iconic Outsider characters in literature, the Underground Man in Fyodor Dostoyevsky’s Notes From Underground (1864) and Harry Haller in Herman Hesse’s Steppenwolf (1927), this essay will explore the social conditions that have given rise to the Outsider with his undeniably bleak vision of the world. The essay will rely on the philosophical works of Friedrich Nietzsche in order to better understand how the figure of the Outsider becomes a response to a stagnant contemporary society weighed down by nihilism. Finally this study will try to understand whether the Outsider is meant to influence us into lives of isolation or whether he acts as a somewhat “negative example” to compel us to engage with society to move away from the traditional moral narratives that are embedded within Western civilisation.
Forever the Nihilist
From novel to novel, the Outsider always appears to be expressing the same discontent with the world around him. His main concern is the fact that:
‘his surroundings seem incapable of fully satisfying his desires. He is afraid that the world was not created to meet the demands of the human spirit. He is troubled and frustrated today, and he is afraid he may die troubled and frustrated’
While the Outsider may take this view to the extreme, his position does seem to resonate with each of us so that, to a degree, the Outsider represents the mindset of the contemporary individual. In the introductory section of Steppenwolf, the unnamed acquaintance of the protagonist expresses his belief that the troubled social misfit Harry Haller is in fact the victim of a contemporary malaise. He reckons that ‘Haller’s sickness of mind is no individual eccentricity, but the sickness of our times themselves, the neurosis of that generation to which Haller belongs.’ The unnamed acquaintance goes on to explain how this sickness does not afflict those ‘who are weak or inferior, but precisely those who are strong, the most intelligent and most gifted.’ This suggests that the Outsider’s discontent is somehow linked to the development of knowledge. Through knowledge and experience acquired in the modern world, the Outsider comes to realise that there is a disconnect between the values society holds as true and their actual “intrinsic” worth.
Harry Haller condemns contemporary life as being ‘stupid and shallow’, ‘horribly, grotesquely questionable’, before concluding that contemporary society does not realise ‘how hopelessly sad and barren their existence is.’ It is with such judgements of the world that the figure of the Outsider has come to represent man broken down by Nihilism. The nihilistic outlook represents a ‘sense of emptiness or “nothingness” befalling a people that [have] no faith in the standards and values that regulate its daily life, but who find no way to bring new values into being.’ The Outsider who finds himself unable to assert his own values, is therefore caught in the middle of a war of values; on one side are values imposed on him by society, values which he can’t help but reject (in principle at least if not fully in practice); and on the other side are the values he desires to assert for himself, a futile task since society around him stops him from doing so. The frustration caused by this state of inbetween-ness is expressed by the Underground Man with his declaration that ‘It is best to do nothing! The best thing is conscious inertia!’ A similar attitude is adopted by another notorious Outsider, Meursault in Albert Camus’s novel The Outsider (1942). Whenever faced with a decision, Meursault ultimately concludes that one way or another it ‘really didn’t matter’ and that such decisions in the world ‘didn’t mean anything’ in the end. The Outsider seems to be constantly pulled in two directions and inaction becomes the only solution. However, given his contempt towards society, why isn’t the Outsider compelled to action, to change reality, to convince the rest of society of its meaningless and instill some sense of value? The Outsider’s inertia is again intrinsically linked to ideas expressed in Nihilism.
German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche (1844 – 1900) believed that nihilism was a result of a contemporary world that no longer believed in the moral ideals (specifically those put forward by Christianity) that had shaped Western civilization, but who despite their failing faith could find no way to establish new values in their lives. Thus as Christianity had become so deeply rooted in the individual through society, the individual is unable to escape the Christian mind set and the moral values it holds as true. Nietzsche perhaps summed this idea up best in his book Twilight of the Idols (1889) with the line: ‘They have got rid of the Christian God, and now feel obliged to cling all the more to Christian morality’. The nihilist outlook of the world is caused because moral concepts have ‘been raised above life in order to regulate and judge life.’ As such morality represses the natural state of man that would allow it to create its own moral laws that are of value to him. Part of Nietzsche’s overall project with his philosophy was to liberate mankind from such an all-encompassing morality, thereby allowing individuals to finally assert values that go beyond morality and concepts such as good and evil. Nietzsche argues that it is the development of society and community has imprisoned all mankind. Therefore an understanding of how society has established its moral values over the course of history becomes key to finding a solution to moving forward. With regards to the Outsider, he would not exist without a social context to be outside of, and his anxieties and angst are partly a result of the stringent confined moral ideals of Western civilization.
Enemy of the State
It is a sentiment that has been expressed time and time again; it is unnatural for man to be alone. Going all the way back to ancient Greece and Aristotle (384 – 322 BC) in his work The Politics, the philosopher discusses the individual in relation to the state: ‘[M]an is by nature a political animal. Any one who by his nature and not simply by ill-luck has no state is either too bad or too good, either subhuman or superhuman.’ In other words the individual who does not form a part of a social domain must be either a beast or a god. Since we can pragmatically rule out any possible supernatural qualities to the Outsider in most literature (at least with regard to the examples noted above and to be further discussed below), and since Aristotle equates social as a natural, ingrained state of being, then this suggests that we should be inclined to consider the Outsider to be a less natural or a downright unnatural being.
A similar point of view is expressed in the English poet John Donne’s (1572 – 1631) Meditation XVII with his now commonly cited line:
‘No man is an Iland, intire of it selfe; every man is a peece of the Continent, a part of the maine.’
The stress is again that it is unnatural for man to live independently from the body of society. The individual is merely a component of the social, a part of a greater whole. The implication of social is that there is a common set of values and morals that are mutually beneficial to the individual and the community. The individual who cuts off his ties from this whole will not only weaken himself but will also cause damage to the social structure. We are therefore meant to be suspicious and disapproving of the Outsider whose fundamental attitude is one of ‘non-acceptance of life, of human life lived by human beings in a human society.’ Furthermore there is also a suggestion that such an autonomous man must not only be shunned but held accountable for his differences, his values that go against the norms and that potentially (or in fact have already) caused damage to the community. It is this system of accountability that is heavily criticised by Nietzsche in a number of his texts including Beyond Good and Evil (1886) and On the Genealogy of Morals (1887).
In these books Nietzsche applies a system of genealogical critique to reconsider our understanding of moral values. Through looking into the development of communities and the etymology of words (sometimes in a rather suspect method) such as good, noble, refined etc. , Nietzsche traces ‘the emergence of moral values without relying upon a prior determination of the value and nature of “morality” and “man”.’ Simply put, are morals good (or bad) intrinsically or are their values formulated over centuries of history in order to serve specific groups of society? Nietzsche does in fact argue that what in contemporary society is designated as good is considered to be so through a process he labels pathos of distance. This process separates the powerful from the weak; thereby originally it was the strong and noble individuals who ‘felt themselves and their actions to be good […] and posited them as such, in contrast to everything low, low-minded, common, and plebeian.’ The actions and qualities of the noble man are therefore categorised as good, while those of the common man are designated bad. The value is not inherent but is ascribed to the moral.
By undermining the assumed value of morals, values that are taken for granted as being correct and applicable to all society, Nietzsche attempts to put forward his vision for a new ‘aristocratic’ mode of life that goes beyond such notions of good and bad. For Nietzsche, life should allow for a strong will to ‘create and affirm its own values’. (This would seemingly suggest that a strong willed Outsider, whose values are different or maybe opposed to those of the community, should have the ability to define his own reality. That having been said, this is not precisely what Nietzsche is positing here and furthermore, as shall be later discussed, the Outsider and the strong willed individual are not necessarily one and the same.) Society however has developed in such a way that it can insidiously disrupt the attempts of individuals to assert their own values and morals. It does so through a system of responsibility, conscience and punishment that keeps individuals accountable towards the community at all times.
Nietzsche argues that ‘it was by means of the morality of custom and the social strait-jacket that man was really made calculable.’ The italicised made is Nietzsche’s stylization and again emphasises how society has constructed such a system that is in no way intrinsic to the natural state of man. The community as a whole acts as a creditor towards its constituents who are held forever in debt towards society because of the comforts and security it offers. Nietzsche asserts:
‘One lives in a community, one enjoys the advantages of a community, one lives protected, looked after, in peace and trust, without a care for certain forms of harm and hostility to which the man outside, the “outlaw” is exposed […] What will happen if the pledge is broken? The community, the deceived creditor, will see that it receives payment, in so far as it can […] [T]he criminal is above all someone who “breaks”, someone who breaks a contractual commitment, breaks his word towards the whole community, in relation to all the goods and amenities of communal life in which he previously shared.’
The ‘man outside’, or the Outsider, is immediately equated with a criminal. He may on the one hand be ‘exposing’ himself to the dangers outside the community, however it is his betrayal towards the whole community that is the real crime and as such he deserves to pay for this disloyalty. For Nietzsche ‘[p]unishment is supposed to have the value of awakening the sense of guilt in the culprit, it is expected to be the actual instrument of the psychic reaction which is called “bad conscience”.’  A bad conscience is formed on guilt and punishment, and Nietzsche calls it a ‘deep sickness’. The conscience therefore acts as a collective memory for society. Because previous transgressors in history were punished for their crimes, each individual knows that should he also transgress he will receive similar punishment. This knowledge deters the individual from breaking the law. It is at this point, by making individuals forever accountable to the community and by instilling in them a permanent fear of transgression, that man ‘makes a transition form a natural to a social animal’. The social tames the natural and causes ‘all the instincts of the wild, free, nomadic man to turn backwards against man himself.’ The importance of this is that the social aspect becomes so ingrained within man, that should he feel his wilder more natural urges surfacing within him, he himself will feel inclined to suppress these because he knows the consequences. This epitomises what Nietzsche labels slave morality where ‘an abstract code of rules and prohibitions that is to be imposed alike upon every form of human life.’ The social therefore becomes a prison for the individual, a ‘strait-jacket’, that keeps him in his place.
Nietzsche’s discussions regarding the social structures of bad conscience and slave morality become significant to the formation of a contemporary understanding of the Outsider since the Outsider is born into such social systems. The Outsider may be aware of the prison he is born into and the meaninglessness of the comforts society offers, however he cannot successfully emancipate himself from the fear of guilt and punishment nor can he fully reject the comforts that society offers him. In Steppenwolf, Harry Haller expresses this exact conflict through his comments on the bourgeois life, which he finds as empty and meaningless. While he does manage to escape the trappings of profession, family and home, he finds that he now stands alone ‘an outsider to all social circles, loved by no one, viewed with suspicion by many, in constant, bitter conflict with public opinion and public morality.’
Furthermore, while the Outsider may recognise that the social constructs of law and religion are there to tame the natural, wild human, he can never leave them behind to live a truly autonomous existence. Similar to Nietzsche himself, the Outsider is aware of how ‘all men and women have these dangerous, unnamable impulses, yet they keep up a pretense, to themselves, to others; their respectability, their philosophy, their religion, are all attempts to gloss over, to make look civilised and rational something that is savage, unorganised, irrational.’ The Outsider is therefore forever in the middle of a tug of war where the social is at one side of the rope. On the other side is something that fits into Nietzsche’s theory of the figure of the Overman.
For Nietzsche, the solution to the stagnation of contemporary society through nihilism can only be achieved through the Übermensch or Overman. The symbolic figure represents an ultimate incarnation of man, one who is nobler, more high-minded and is capable of determining his own values without needing the approval of the community. The Overman is capable of transcending the moral values that confine humanity, a morality based on bad conscience and slave morality, as he ‘does not engage in moral argument by offering new and “better” moral values; rather it looks at what values do and what form of life they promote.’ The Overman thus represents ‘a mode of being that knows only affirmation and creates values from the experience of plenitude and strength.’
The Outsider is the result of the tension between the opposite forces of slave morality and the Overman. At some level, the Outsider desperately longs to transcend society he lives in, one that he deems meaningless and of no true value. He aspires to be nobler and more high-minded however is unable to emancipate himself from the hold of moral ideals that he was born into. Finding himself pulled in both directions, by such powerful forces, the Outsider is ultimately left suspended in between, inert, and incapable of taking action. There is no point in action because there is no feasible way for him to overcome slave morality successfully, to reach the elevated existence of the Overman. He realises that despite his knowledge of the truth, he can only ever live another hollow, empty life like the rest of society around him that he despises. So in this light being aware of the truth can only cause pain. It this knowledge that causes the Underground Man to equate consciousness and intellect with an illness: ‘I swear to you that to think too much is a disease, a real, actual disease.’ Similarly Harry Haller who is described as being ‘a rare and unusually gifted individual’ and ‘an intellectual’ is also regarded as a man who is ‘in some way or other mentally or temperamentally ill’. It is Haller’s intellect that appears to be at the root of this illness. And it is this illness which, like the Underground Man, causes him ‘constant and acute suffering’. Therefore being an intellectual, acquiring knowledge and truth, turns against the Outsider. It becomes a curse from which the Outsider finds no refuge since he is alone, misunderstood and is keenly aware of his abnormality. Whenever he tries to assert his values, or break away from the norms, he is only too aware that his attempts merely look like ‘self-justification by a man who knows himself to be degenerate, diseased, self-divided.’ As such the Outsider begins to loathe himself even more than the world he already detests so much. Harry Haller is again representative of this where his harrow disposition is said to not have been ‘based on contempt for the world but on self-contempt, for however ruthlessly critical he could be when condemning institutions or individuals, he never spared himself. He himself was always the first target of his barbed remarks, the prime object of his hatred and rejection.’ It is this scathing self-loathing that causes the Outsider extreme shame and suffering. And it is arguably through his suffering that the Outsider finds some sort of solace.
Pain is so close to Pleasure
No one suffers in quite the same fashion as the Outsider. He appears to take pride in the levels of suffering he can tolerate. Consider the Underground Man who declares that ‘secretly, in my heart, I would gnaw and nibble and probe and suck away at myself until the bitter taste turned at last into a kind of shameful, devilish sweetness and, finally, downright definite pleasure. Yes, pleasure, pleasure!’ . Such is the twisted mind of the Underground Man that he maintains that ‘[t]here is pleasure even in toothache.’ Haller is likewise described as having ‘a peculiar genius for suffering’ whereby ‘his capacity for suffering was masterly, limitless, awesome.’ Suffering becomes an art form, a mode of existence that ennobles the Outsider and provides him with a reason to continue living. This is more than mere masochism. It is again Nietzsche who sheds light on the complex virtues derived from suffering.
As has been discussed, the long-term project of Nietzsche’s philosophy was to liberate mankind from the moral ideals as developed through the history of Western civilization, and restore in man his natural, wilder, and in Nietzsche’s mind more ‘aristocratic’ qualities. For Nietzsche it was the ancient Greeks who were the epitome of such aristocratic qualities, and this was represented especially through their dramatic form of tragedy. Greek tragedy is important for Nietzsche, as he believed that at its best it went way beyond reductive concepts such ideals and morals. Tragedy portrayed the powerful untamed forces of the universe in all their guises and did not attempt to offer the audience a moral interpretation of life or ‘a teleological vision of a purpose or goal to existence.’ Therefore when faced with such tragedy one must transcend the individual subjective existence and enter into ‘the eternal flux of life in which suffering, pain and violence are inextricably linked to joy, power and creativity.’  In this context, to suffer and feel immense pain will inevitably lead to an enriched form of existence. What is perhaps most important about the aristocratic mode of suffering is that it is no way linked to guilt and conscience. One does not suffer as punishment for a crime or sin. Stronger forces are inevitably going to try and impress their power upon weaker individuals. In Greek tragedy, this is merely the way of the world. Arguably, the Outsider, who is disillusioned with the arbitrary and ultimately meaningless values of the contemporary world, is again, at some level of consciousness, drawn to this nobler, more innate, concept of suffering. However the Outsider once more finds himself in a tug of war situation, where the contemporary definition of suffering still has a strong hold on him.
Suffering in the contemporary world is again deeply linked to Nietzsche’s concept of slave morality. Nietzsche argues that the only way weaker and oppressed individuals could alleviate their situation was through the ascetic ideal. The ascetic ideal allows weaker individuals or communities to equate their inferior forms of existence as a prerequisite for spiritual purity. The ascetic prizes spiritual values over worldly ones and thereby the ascetic ideal overturns the aristocratic.  Nietzsche states:
‘Only those who suffer are good, only the poor, the powerless, the lowly are good; the suffering, the deprived, the sick, the ugly, are the only pious people, the only ones saved, salvation is for them alone, whereas you rich, the noble and powerful, you are eternally wicked, cruel, lustful, insatiate, godless, you will also be eternally wretched, cursed and damned!’
Thus the ascetic completely redefines concepts such as good and noble. Whereas such concepts were before synonymous with rich or powerful they now came to mean blessed or poor. It gives meaning and value to those who see themselves as insignificant in a temporal value system. Furthermore, whereas before the weak would blame the strong for their suffering, and it was therefore the strong who were guilty for their pain, now ‘each of us becomes responsible for our own suffering’. Living life comfortably becomes the true sin. If one is not suffering in this life then they are sure to face punishment in the next. Unlike the aristocratic mode of suffering, here guilt and conscience define suffering. For Nietzsche asceticism must be overcome as it deprives individuals of their will and continues to define morals through a system of slave morality that governs all society. The individual is again not allowed to assert his own values. However what the ascetic ideal does do successfully is that it promises a more fulfilling existence after this corporeal one.
For the Outsider, who finds the corporeal world an inadequate reality that cannot sustain his true boundless spirit, the “next life” would seem to offer the ultimate prize. So suffering in this life gives him motive. Moreover it could be argued that at some level there is a strong desire within the Outsider to die in order to get to the next life, despite him being aware that this is merely another meaningless moral ideal construct put in place by a governing system such as Christianity. On the other hand the Outsider also seems to be drawn to the aristocratic ideal, that of suffering as part of life in itself, suffering which can enrich this life. Life here on earth must be lived no matter how intolerable it proves to be to the Outsider. The ascetic and aristocratic ideals pull the Outsider in two opposing direction. This arguably explains why the Outsider appears to be drawn to death and yet never seems to be able to actively end his own life. Interestingly the Outsider can’t help but facilitate his own demise.
In Steppenwolf, Harry Haller is handed a treatise that explains his isolation and dissatisfaction with the world. The treatise discusses Haller’s tendency to contemplate suicide, which is deemed to be indicative of his outsider-ness. The treatise states:
‘suicide cases appear to us to be suffering from guilt feelings with regard to their very individuality. They are those individuals who no longer see self-development and fulfillment as their life’s aim, but rather the dissolution of self, a return to the womb, to God, to the cosmos. Very many people of this kind are utterly incapable of really committing suicide because they have a profound insight into the sinful nature of the act. In our eyes they are nevertheless suicide cases because they see death as their saviour, not life’
In this extract, death seems to represent a form of afterlife akin to that presented in the ascetic ideal. The suffering he endures in this life will come to an end in the next. Haller is drawn to death as he senses it will finally provide him with meaning that he has been searching for all his life. However he also recognises that ‘the nobler and finer course is to let oneself be defeated and laid low by life itself rather than by one’s own hand.’ This notion of being defeated by life is also similar to Nietzsche aristocratic mode of suffering; where to live an enriched life one has to suffer as a rite of passage almost. While this is not expressed so matter-of-factly in Notes from Underground, the Underground Man does seem to share the same conflicting ideas about life and death. The Underground Man introduces himself as ‘a sick man’ who has ‘something wrong with my liver.’ Yet he refuses to treat his illness. On the one hand this increases his suffering – perhaps another example of the aristocratic ideal – and yet this arguably expedites his death and allows him to exit the meaningless existences he believes he inhabits. He is doomed to live in suffering without any real compensation. He may derive some form of enjoyment from his pain, which allows him to feel superior to the rest of society, however we are never convinced that the Outsider truly believes he is gaining anything of true value from such suffering. There is no sense of enlightened calm produced by his suffering, such as one associates with a Mother Theresa. One almost senses that if it weren’t for the fact that Christian morality is so imbedded within Western society and has deemed suicide as a horrendous sin, the Outsider would gladly take his own life. However he is once again rendered inert by forces that are far more powerful than his own will.
More than anything the Outsider seems to represent an ideal. He places his own ideal against another. In the end nothing is achieved aside from the suffering and misery of one individual. The Outsider is unable to change his own reality or influence change around him. The authors of such characters seem to intentionally create within the Outsider an impossible ideal in order to highlight the futility of such pursuits. In the foreword to Notes from Underground, Dostoyevsky explains that his Underground Man is meant to be a ‘representative figure’ who stands in for the collective public. Furthermore the protagonist is made ‘in a more striking form than is his usual character belonging to the very recent past’. Thus the Underground Man is a composite character who is simultaneously everyman and no man. He rejects society, perhaps for the right reasons, however he does not help alleviate his situation in any way. Is there an implication that the Underground Man would have been better off using his angst in order to engage with society and better the situation for himself and the rest of society?
In an afterword to Steppenwolf, author Hesse expresses his concern for how readers seem to only identify with Haller’s ideals, and that by identifying exclusively with this outsider they failed to recognise that ‘the book speaks and knows of other things than just Harry Haller and his difficulties.’ He goes on to say that readers ‘failed to see that a second, higher, timeless realm exists […] a positive, serene, supra-personal, timeless world of faith that contrasts markedly with Steppenwolf’s world of suffering.’ Hesse concludes by wishing that ‘readers could recognise that although Steppenwolf’s story is one of sickness and crises, these do not end in death of destruction. On the contrary: they result in a cure.’  It appears that Hesse definitely did not write the character of Haller to inspire readers into a life of isolation and suffering. While he does not posit any definite intention for his work, do we sense an intimation that the reader should learn from this Outsider figure in order to find a cure, a solution to the anxieties caused by contemporary society?
While Notes from Underground and Steppenwolf are in no way didactic, they do suggest that they were written with an intention to illustrate the problems of Western civilization and the contemporary individual. The Outsider, in his isolation offers no solution. For the authors the Outsider does seem to exemplify a dead-end. Arguably while the reader may get caught up in the Outsider’s romanticised worldview of nihilism, s/he is never truly inspired to emulate the Outsider in his extremism. Instead the reader steps into the Outsider’s shoes temporarily, finds some brief catharsis for his/her existential angst, and uses the fictional figure as a means to question society and its values, but so to better and make more truthful their own lives.
 Colin Wilson, The Outsider (London: Victor Gollancz, 1960) p. 47.
 Wilson, p. 49.
 Hermann Hesse, Steppenwolf (London: Penguin, 2012) Kindle eBook.
 Lee Spinks, Friedrich Nietzsche (London: Routledge, 2003) p. 17.
 Fyodor Dostoyevsky, Notes from Underground (London: Penguin, 1972) p. 43.
 Albert Camus, The Outsider (London: Penguin, 2000) p. 14.
 Ibid., p. 38.
 Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols or, How to Philosophise with a Hammer (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1997) p. 53.
 Spinks, p. 18.
 Aristotle, The Politics (London: Penguin, 1992) p. 59.
 John Donne, Devotions Upon Emergent Occasions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1923) p. 98.
 Wilson, p. 18.
 Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) p. 14.
 Spinks, p. 58.
 Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals p. 12.
 Spinks, p. 62.
 Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals p. 40.
 Ibid., p. 52.
 Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, p. 62.
 Ibid., p. 64.
 Spinks, p. 63.
 Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals (p. 65.
 Spinks, p. 63.
 Hesse, Steppenwolf.
 Wilson, p. 13.
 Spinks, p. 116.
 Spinks, p. 116.
 Dostoyevsky, p. 17.
 Wilson, p. 14.
 Dostoyevsky, p. 19.
 Ibid., p. 24.
 Spinks, p. 61.
 Spinks, p. 101.
 Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, p. 82.
 Spinks, p. 111.
 Spinks, p. 112.
 Dostoyevsky, p. 15.
 Dostoyevsky, p. 15.
 Ibid., p. 15.